Redefining neuromarketing as an integrated science of influence by Hans C. Breiter et al.
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE
published: 12 February 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.01073
Redefining neuromarketing as an integrated science of
influence
Hans C. Breiter1,2,3*†, Martin Block3,4†, Anne J. Blood2,3†, Bobby Calder3,5†, Laura Chamberlain3,6†,
Nick Lee3,7†, Sherri Livengood1,3†, Frank J. Mulhern3,4†, Kalyan Raman1,3,4†, Don Schultz3,4†,
Daniel B. Stern1,3†, Vijay Viswanathan3,4† and Fengqing (Zoe) Zhang3,8,9†
1 Warren Wright Adolescent Center, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, IL, USA
2 Mood and Motor Control Laboratory or Laboratory of Neuroimaging and Genetics, Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, USA
3 Applied Neuromarketing Consortium, Medill, Kellogg, and Feinberg Schools, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
4 Medill Integrated Marketing Communications, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
5 Department of Marketing, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
6 Aston Business School, Birmingham, UK
7 School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK
8 Department of Statistics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
9 Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Edited by:
Sven Braeutigam, University of
Oxford, UK
Reviewed by:
Arun Bokde, Trinity College Dublin,
Ireland
Giovanni Vecchiato, Sapienza
University of Rome, Italy
*Correspondence:
Hans C. Breiter, Warren Wright
Adolescent Center, Department of
Psychiatry and Behavioral Science,
Northwestern University Feinberg
School of Medicine, 710 N. Lake
Shore Dr., Abbott Hall 1301,
Chicago, IL 60611, USA
e-mail: h-breiter@northwestern.edu
†These authors have contributed
equally to this work.
Multiple transformative forces target marketing, many of which derive from new
technologies that allow us to sample thinking in real time (i.e., brain imaging), or to
look at large aggregations of decisions (i.e., big data). There has been an inclination to
refer to the intersection of these technologies with the general topic of marketing as
“neuromarketing”. There has not been a serious effort to frame neuromarketing, which
is the goal of this paper. Neuromarketing can be compared to neuroeconomics, wherein
neuroeconomics is generally focused on how individuals make “choices”, and represent
distributions of choices. Neuromarketing, in contrast, focuses on how a distribution of
choices can be shifted or “influenced”, which can occur at multiple “scales” of behavior
(e.g., individual, group, or market/society). Given influence can affect choice through
many cognitive modalities, and not just that of valuation of choice options, a science of
influence also implies a need to develop a model of cognitive function integrating attention,
memory, and reward/aversion function. The paper concludes with a brief description of
three domains of neuromarketing application for studying influence, and their caveats.
Keywords: neuromarketing, neuroeconomics, marketing communications, neuroimaging, scaling, influence, choice
INTRODUCTION
Marketing has been dominated for over a century by models
that assume a rational process of persuasion, which follows a
sequence from awareness through purchase that consumers can
consciously articulate. While this approach fits with traditional
research methodologies, it hasn’t always explained or predicted
purchase behavior. Recent developments suggest that a new per-
spective may be emerging. In particular, marketers have sought
to integrate ideas about non-rational and rational processes
(Kahneman, 2011), and ideas related to social neuroscience vs.
individual decision-making (Lee et al., 2007; Senior and Lee,
2008), as well as using methods and technologies aligned with
neuroscience (Ioannides et al., 2000; Braeutigam, 2005; Vecchiato
et al., 2011; Plassmann et al., 2012). Some have been quick to
label—not always in a complimentary manner—such develop-
ments as “neuromarketing” (e.g., Laybourne and Lewis, 20051).
1See Brain scam? (2004). Nat. Neurosci. 7, 683. doi:10.1038/nn0704-683;
and Neuromarketing: beyond branding (2004). The Lancet Neurol. 3, 71.
doi:10.1016/S1474-4422(03)00643-4.
To date, neuromarketing has lacked a solid theoretical
framework. As such, the term “neuromarketing” itself runs
the risk of confusing more fundamental scientific research
with commercial applications (Lee et al., 2007; Javor et al.,
2013). In this paper, we seek to extend existing work (e.g.,
Fugate, 2007; Hubert and Kenning, 2008; Senior and Lee, 2008;
Wilson et al., 2008; Fisher et al., 2010), to clarify a frame-
work for neuromarketing as an integrated science of influence.
We start by contrasting neuroeconomics to neuromarketing.
We then consider the concept of influence across individuals,
groups, communities and markets, along with its dependency
on an integrated model of mental function, along with some
key—often unrecognized—caveats that must be considered by
neuromarketing researchers.
INFLUENCE VS. CHOICE
It is helpful to compare neuromarketing to neuroeconomics,
with which it may appear to overlap. Neuroeconomics tends
to focus on individual and group choice, or judgment and
decision-making in the context of consumables or markets
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Neuroeconomics focuses on the model of choice, which is
centered on how we assess reward/aversion. This flow diagram shows four
steps involved in making a choice. For the second step, there are several
theories that have been proposed to model valuation of choices. Matching
theory and alliesthesia (hedonic deficit theory) are two theories heavily
used in neuroscience. Prospect and portfolio theory are used in economics.
All four theories have been used in neuroeconomics. New to the set of
valuation theories is relative preference theory (RPT) that is the only
valuation theory meeting Feynman criteria for lawfulness, using an
information variable, or actually scaling from group to individual behavior.
Because of this scaling across group and individual behavior, and the fact it
can be framed as a power law, RPT actually encodes the fundamental
features of the other four theories, and can be used to ground them or even
derive them. (B) In contrast to economics and neuroeconomics with their
focus on choice, marketing is focused on “influence”, which looks at how
distributions of choice behavior can be shifted or altered. This diagram
sketches one potential model for the effect of influence on behavior.
Influence can be considered the difference in gradients for preference
inside a person (or organism) and outside a person. These gradients of
preference might be schematized by RPT. They would be filtered and
processed by valuation functions mentioned in panel (A), which include
alliesthesia or hedonic deficit theory regarding what is in deficit for an
individual, along with matching, prospect theory, and the variance mean
approach to portfolio theory. This processing would facilitate integration of
the gradient inputs and determine what goal-objects or events become the
focus of behavior, along with providing the intensity for it. Other cognitive
functions such as memory are critical to this processing and evaluation of
relative costs/benefits to prospective behavior; together they give behavior
its direction and intensity. Behavior, in turn, feeds back onto these internal
and external gradients of preference as experienced utility of expressed
behavior.
(Figure 1A; Camerer, 2008). This focus on choice is dis-
tinct from the focus in neuromarketing on the issue of how
individuals and groups might be shifted from one pattern of
decisions to another pattern, or to change their distribution of
choices.
Much neuromarketing research to this point has been focused
on optimal methods to shift the distribution of choices (e.g.,
Ambler et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2004; Ohme et al., 2009; Santos
et al., 2011). The use of “neuro” as a prefix has thus followed a
similar rationale to that of neuroeconomics, whereby study of the
neural processes provides a tool for describing behavioral change
that was not available by the study of behavior alone (Ariely and
Berns, 2010).
Such a view of neuromarketing ignores the broader perspective
on what might be called “influence”, which is the primary issue
involved with marketing, advertising, engineering design, teach-
ing, or behavioral change in medicine. All of these categories of
“influence” focus on how to get people to engage in a behavior
preferred by a corporation, government, trade-group, culture or
other entity. From an ethical perspective, discussions regarding
consumer rights, for example privacy, are key when considering
the influencing of behavior by interest groups, and neuromarket-
ing research has been a subject of some interest in this regard (e.g.,
Murphy et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2008). Nonetheless, influence
doesn’t just shift the distribution of choices to one favored by
the interest group in question, but balances between internal
and external forces on behavior. Influence might be considered
a balance between gradients of preference within an individual
or group that influence events outside of them, and gradients of
preference outside the individual or group that influence events
inside of them.
Such gradients of preference could be schematized by patterns
of approach and avoidance decisions (i.e., the distribution of
choice) as described by relative preference theory (RPT; Breiter
and Kim, 2008; Kim et al., 2010), an empirically-based account
of reward/aversion resembling prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Breiter et al., 2001) but grounded in informa-
tion theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) to account for pat-
terns in decisions that can be connected to reward/aversion
circuitry and genetic polymorphisms (e.g., Perlis et al., 2008;
Gasic et al., 2009). Using RPT, internal and external gradients
of preference would involve variables quantifying (a) the pat-
tern of approach decisions; and (b) the pattern of avoidance
decisions. In the case of internal preferences, these would char-
acterize the individual, whereas in the case of external prefer-
ences these might characterize a group of people external to
the individual (or a preference gradient from just one other
external person). RPT allows individual and group preferences
to be readily characterized in a quantitative, lawful fashion
that scales between individual and group. The integration of
internal (e.g., individual) and external (e.g., group) gradients
of preference would then be given direction in distinct deci-
sion/planning/problem solving situations by the processes briefly
schematized in Figures 1A,B. Gradients of preference given direc-
tion by hedonic deficit theory (i.e., alliesthesia; Cabanac, 1971;
Paulus, 2007) and other valuation processes (necessary for incor-
porating probabilities related to goal-objects, Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; relative valuations across goal-objects, Herrnstein,
1961; and variance in valuation, Markowitz, 1952) would consti-
tute the combined intrinsic and extrinsic motivation described
by Deci and Ryan (1985), leading to behavior, which in turn
feeds back into gradients of preferences based on the experi-
enced utility in individuals involved (see Kahneman et al., 1997).
Such a schema is shown in Figure 1B as one of many pos-
sibilities for how internal and external gradients are balanced
through their effects on behavior, and can shift distributions of
choice.
In considering the balance between internal and external pref-
erence, cognitive processes thought to be separate from that of the
valuation of options come into play, such as perception, attention,
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FIGURE 2 | (A) This schema describes an engineering-based behavioral
science (EBS) model of psychological domains that can be integrated in
accordance with existing non- engineering-based models of emotion. Unlike
other frameworks, EBS evaluates mathematical, law-like relationships
between cognitive domains such as (i) reward/aversion processing, (ii)
attention, (iii) memory, and (iv) perception, rather than associative
relationships based purely on statistics. There are a number of modern
theoretical constructs for emotion, including two examples shown from work
by (B) Barrett and (C) Gross, and they tend to include the components we
suggest integrating through EBS. (D) Individuals, groups, and/or
societies/markets can exert “influence” to shift distributions of choice
behavior in others. This expression of “influence” can be exerted within scale
and across scale (e.g., by a group on an individual). Neuromarketing uses the
valuation aspect of neuroeconomics (i.e., reward/aversion processing) and
tries to integrate it with other behavioral science and neuroscience
constructs, such as attention, memory and perception, which are all
components of the EBS model. It tries to do this at the level of the individual,
the group, and society, which are each different scales of measure.
and memory (Ioannides et al., 2000; Ariely and Berns, 2010). At
this time, no theoretical schema and little empirical data exist for
how these theoretically independent cognitive processes interact,
but cognitive processes for perception of outside stimuli exerting
influence, attention to their features, and memory for comparison
of such features to prior percepts are necessary operations for
processing “influence”. Exerting “influence” to change another’s
behavior, or being the subject of outside “influence” to change
your own behavior thus need to be considered in a much broader
construct of mental operations (see Figure 2A). One must also
recognize that this ensemble of operations (i.e., perception, atten-
tion, memory, reward/aversion processing) have been extensively
theorized to be core processes for emotion (Breiter and Gasic,
2004; Barrett, 2006; Gross, 2009, 2013; Kuppens et al., 2013;
Lindquist et al., 2013). Specific examples of this are schematized
in Figures 2B,C for the models of Barrett (2006) and Gross (2009,
2013).
The balance between internal and external forces on behav-
ior (e.g., respectively, internal emotional experience (or inter-
nal preference gradient) vs. emotional expression by entities
outside the individual (or external preference gradient)) must
also be apparent at the neural level of measurement, given
that “brain and mind are one”, a fundamental hypothesis of
neuroscience (e.g., Breiter and Rosen, 1999; Breiter and Gasic,
2004; Breiter et al., 2006). This view of neuromarketing thus has
as its focus an understanding of the balance between internal
and external preferences (emotional experiences), on individ-
uals and groups. Neural measures of one individual or inter-
acting individuals (e.g., as with joint trust games; King-Casas
et al., 2005; Tomlin et al., 2006) can be made in parallel
with behavioral ones to confirm that observations made at the
behavioral level affect those at other levels of spatiotemporal orga-
nization, or actually scale across levels of spatiotemporal orga-
nization (i.e., group behavior, individual behavior, distributed
neural groups, neural group, etc.). Influence can thus be thought
of as being present across multiple spatiotemporal levels of
measurement, from group measures to measures of individual
behavior to neural groups, etc. The issue of scaling might be
considered as a “layering of influence” and warrants further
discussion.
LAYERS OF INFLUENCE AND COMMUNITIES AFFECTED
Scaling is rarely discussed in experimental psychology and other
behavioral disciplines, and was not formally introduced into
behavioral science and neuroscience until the 1990s by Sutton
and Breiter (1994). In its adaptation to biology and behavior,
scaling refers to how measures made at one level of spatiotemporal
organization, relate in a principled, lawful manner to measures at
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other spatiotemporal levels of organization (Sutton and Breiter,
1994; Perelson et al., 2006; Savage and West, 2006). This rela-
tionship does not represent a statistical one where a certain
amount of the variance at one level of measure can predict the
variance at another level, or how some information at one layer of
organization can specify some extent of information at another
layer (Adami, 2004; Szostak, 2004). Instead, it is causal (i.e.,
mechanistic) in that the same patterns of behavior measured at
one layer are also measured at a neighboring level, and there is
a necessary relationship (Sutton and Breiter, 1994; Breiter and
Gasic, 2004; Breiter et al., 2006). Given that it has not been a
major topic in behavior science or neuroscience, few biological
measures have yet been shown to scale. One behavior that does
show scaling is that of circadian rhythms, which show measures
that scale from behavior to distributed groups of neurons to
individual neural groups to cells and molecular biology. The other
is approach/avoidance behavior described by RPT, scaling from
group behavior to individual behavior, and potentially to other
scales (Breiter and Kim, 2008; Kim et al., 2010). To date, few
behavioral constructs outside of RPT have been tested to Feynman
criteria for lawfulness, which includes scaling (Feynman et al.,
1963).
Scaling has become an important metaphor/analogy in con-
sidering the statistical association of measures made at one
spatiotemporal scale vs. another, as with the Research Domain
Criteria project (RDoC) sponsored out of the National Institutes
of Health (NIMH; Insel et al., 2010; Morris and Cuthbert, 2012;
Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). The RDoC project and projects spon-
sored out of the National Institutes of Health Connectome Project
(Van Essen et al., 2012; Barch et al., 2013) focus on measures at
different spatiotemporal scales that can predict some degree of
variance in each other. Both the RDoC and Connectome projects
are directly modeled after the Phenotype Genotype Project in
Addiction and Mood Disorders (PGP),2 which successfully dis-
covered measures that scale across levels (i.e., RPT; Breiter and
Kim, 2008; Kim et al., 2010).
While scaling is a sine qua non of classical science across lev-
els of spatiotemporal organization, constructs that have become
fundamental to more contemporary approaches to science have
also become active considerations in neuroscience, in particular
the issue of uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Knill and
Pouget, 2004; Gallistel and King, 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Vilares
and Kording, 2011). Scaling and uncertainty are of interest with
regard to neuromarketing, in that there is a common intuition
that influence occurs between individuals, between individuals
and a group, and between groups. As schematized in Figure 2D,
influence is thought to occur in the interaction between individ-
uals, who are embedded within groups, so that they affect their
respective groups, and the larger framework (e.g., society, market)
in which that group exists. This embedding of individuals/groups
can be directly analogized to the embedding of networks (Sutton
and Breiter, 1994).
2Lawler, A. “White house stirs interest in brain-imaging initiative”, Science,
News, August 2, 2002; Abbott A. “Addicted”, Nature’s Senior European
Correspondent, Nature, News Feature, October 31, 2002; and http://pgp.
mgh.harvard.edu
This model of influence across scales of organization (e.g.,
individual, group, society/market) also relates to issues of
uncertainty due to information loss in the communication
between individuals/groups, or the uncertainty related to impre-
cision in the interpretation of communicated emotions (e.g.,
Figures 2B–D). Characterizing influence by scaling and uncer-
tainty has some appeal, but begs the issue of what influence is in
this context. When one considers influence in this model, it comes
across as resembling a field of sorts, with a gradient of effects
as two entities wielding influence come in greater proximity
to each other (Figure 1B). To date, there has been no formal
definition of influence, either through axiomatic derivation, or
through iterative modeling (Banks and Tran, 2011) of behavior
data to show a specific mathematical formulation of a pattern
in a graph. Such work is clearly needed, and likely will depend
on the cognitive processes identified to underlie this “field”
of influence, such as those involved with emotion, discussed
previously.
One might consider influence, and its potential scaling and
effects of uncertainty, as a product of human psychology and
the sub-processes underlying human information processing.
Such considerations point to the importance of having a com-
plete model of mental functioning, which is as yet lacking.
Neuromarketing investigations can have a major input into the
development of this integrated model, if they are conducted
from a consistent and coherent theoretical base as discussed
herein.
BASING INFLUENCE ON AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF
MENTAL FUNCTION
At this time, we have no unified model of the mind, which
shows how sub-processes such as attention, memory and
reward/aversion processing are integrated and function concur-
rently for decision-making, planning, and problem solving. When
one opens any cognitive science/biological psychology textbook,
one finds chapters on information theory, perception, attention,
decision-making, etc., but nothing integrating them. Even the use
of the term information theory—although considered the basis of
cognitive science—was never used in its mathematical framework
in cognitive science until approximately 4–6 years ago (Breiter
and Kim, 2008; Tononi, 2008; Gallistel and King, 2009; Kim et al.,
2010). For the most part, marketers have relied on thinking about
judgment and decision-making in terms of cognitive biases and
mental functions involved with choice.
Recently, attention has been given to the building of such
an integrated model of mental processing, starting with efforts
to look at the input end of cognitive function, and to consider
how quantitative descriptions of processes for reward/aversion,
attention, and memory might work together. This work has
led to research (Viswanathan et al., Under review) integrating
parts of RPT (representing reward/aversion) with variables from
signal detection theory (representing attention), and combining
signal detection theory with Ebbinghaus memory functions to
unpack sub-processes mediating working memory (Reilly et al.,
Under review). This early work argues that cognitive science
constructs can be integrated, and points to the large amount of
work needed to develop a comprehensive merger of domains in
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cognitive science, including domains such as decision-making,
planning, and problem solving, along with output of the sys-
tem in terms of motor behavior, language, and autonomic
functions.
The ultimate integration of these cognitive functions can be
analogized to a wall chart in biochemistry where all chemical
pathways underlying biological metabolism are organized. We
are a long way from having such an integrated platform for
mental operations, particularly since such integrated systems as
in biochemistry also convey mechanism and allow causal infer-
ence. In the short term, the viability of such an effort can start
with developing complete constructs for attention, memory, and
reward/aversion processing. Complete constructs for attention,
for instance, would necessitate the mathematical description of
the relationship between focused, selective, sustained, divided,
and alternating attention. The potential for such complete con-
structs to be integrated across functions (i.e., perception, atten-
tion, memory, and reward/aversion processing) would then be
a necessary second step in testing the viability of developing a
general model of the mind.
Development of such a general model of mental function
would allow us to theorize and empirically test what set of
functions together respond to influence from another individ-
ual/organism, and exert influence on individuals/organisms out-
side of the person. With an integration of, at minimum, the
functions thought to comprise emotion and memory thereof,
cognitive psychology would likely be able to begin defining a
quantitative model of influence. Such an effort will also depend
on parallel assessments of the integrated cognitive model through
approaches that (1) assess how well the integrated cognitive con-
struct fits with neuroscience measures; (2) determine if impor-
tant features of the construct can be derived axiomatically (an
approach used extensively in traditional economics); and (3) test
if the integrated cognitive construct facilitates the analysis of large
data sets of human consumption and media use (referred to
as “big data”), which should show features of human cognitive
function.
Even so, efforts devoted towards developing neuromarketing
as a science of influence, and towards a general model of mental
function must remain cognizant of the risks inherent in such
research, particularly given the persuasiveness of brain imaging
(Roskies, 2008). Such risks are well covered in other founda-
tional literature (e.g., Senior et al., 2011), but it is worth noting
here that the subtractive and reverse inferential methodologies—
predicated on observing specific brain region activity associated
with specific tasks—are unable to conclusively confirm either
the necessity of that specific region for that specific task, nor
the lack of involvement of other regions, particularly in complex
tasks (Friston et al., 1996; Poldrack, 2006, 2008). Confounds can
also arise in neuroscientific studies of behavioral change (i.e.,
influence). It is a mistake to assume that one wants changes
in both behavior and brain signal to interpret the effect of any
influence. Such circumstances only lend themselves to interpre-
tation when there is a parametric variation in both variables,
which in turn can lead to a power problem. Rather, it is usu-
ally preferable for variables in either behavior or neuroimaging
change, assuming the (often unrecognized) issue that baseline
or comparative conditions remain unchanged also. Similarly,
one must control for hormonal and demographic variables,
which have been shown to influence key neuroimaging variables
(Goldstein et al., 2005, 2010; Breiter et al., 2006). A final caveat
is that we still do not understand the processes by which dis-
tributed groups of cells “process information” (e.g., Freeman,
2001). The functional domains of biochemistry, molecular biol-
ogy, and genetics are quite distinct from those we hypothesize
for behavior (e.g., attention, memory, reward/aversion process-
ing, etc.), and how distributed neural groups produce functional
domains and interact is far from understood. As such, all neural
signals must be looked at as providing ancillary support for
measures made at other spatiotemporal scales (e.g., behavior or
genetics).
There also remain key issues in the use of “big data”
approaches to neuromarketing. In particular, the high-
dimensionality and huge size of data sets in this context can
lead to inferential problems of their own—particularly spurious
correlations, noise accumulation, and incidental homogeneity
(e.g., Fan and Fan, 2008; Fan et al., 2013). The often uncontrolled
and naturalistic collection of such data sets also has the potential
to raise issues of public interest regarding the ethics of social
research (e.g., Kramer et al., 2014). That said, as long as
researchers approach their work in light of such caveats, big
data provides opportunities for neuromarketing as a science
of influence, in particular due to (i) its cohort sizes; (ii) its
attention to demographic and socio-economic variables; and (iii)
its broad array of variables that can be aligned to neuroscience
variables.
SUMMARY
This manuscript provides a theoretical framework for neuro-
marketing based on the process of influence, and how it shifts
distributions of choice across many scales of measurement,
from individual to group/market and society. As opposed to
issues of choice, issues of influence encompass a broader array
of behavioral science domains, pointing to the importance of
developing a rigorous quantitative model of mental function,
which can provide testable hypotheses for how distributions
of choice are shifted across scale and within scale (i.e., from
individuals to groups/market to society and back again). How-
ever, a tremendous amount of work is needed to get to this
point, and this work will need to meet the highest of aca-
demic standards if it is to change standards of practice and have
real relevance for the marketing community and those involved
with influence or behavior change, whether that be in educa-
tion, medicine, business, marketing communications, design, or
political policy.
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